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Abstract 
Access to reliable energy is central to improvements in living standards and is a Sustainable 
Development Goal. This study moves beyond counting the electrified households and 
examines the effect of the hours of electricity households receives on their welfare. We 
hypothesize that additional hours of electricity have different effects on the poor, the middle 
income and the rich, as well as in rural and urban areas. The methods used are panel fixed 
effects instrumental variables, cross sectional fixed effects instrumental variables, and 
logistic regression with data from the Indian Human Development Survey 2005-2012. We 
focus on extensive and the intensity margins, i.e. how access and additional hours of 
electricity affect household welfare in terms of consumption expenditure, income, assets 
and poverty status. The results show large gaps between the benefits and costs of electricity 
supply among consumer groups. We also find that electricity theft is positively correlated 
with the net returns from electrification. Progressive pricing with targeted subsidies for the 
poor can increase household welfare while reducing the financial losses of the State 
Electricity Boards. 
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Instrumental Variables Approach. 
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1. Introduction 
The seventh Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) focuses on access, cleanliness, renewability 
along with efficiency in terms of supply intensity, research, and upgrading of technologies to 
produce energy (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2019). Although the United 
Nations recognizes the significance of reliability, the policy impetus has been on counting 
electrified households without measuring the intensive margins of electricity supply in a day. 
Affordability, availability, and quality of service varies significantly among those who have and 
receive connections in developing countries. This is qualitatively well known, but not well 
characterized or quantified in research on benefits of energy access to households. There is also a 
gap in the research in the analyses of the intensive margin, i.e. how additional hours of electricity 
affect household welfare. 
Some studies have examined the effect of extensive margin of electricity availability on household 
income in India at a cross sectional level (Khandker et al., 2014), the effect of intensive margin of 
quality on non-farm enterprise income in India at a cross sectional level (Rao, 2013), and a 
satisfaction survey of electricity reliability at the household level in India (Aklin et al., 2016). 
However, there has been no study of how household welfare has changed overtime with changes 
at the intensive margin of electricity given that not all people can afford private sources of 
electricity. We measure household consumption, income, assets and poverty status associated to 
different income levels and in areas where private energy supply is weak and during a time when 
significant reforms were undertaken to electrify all households in India and claims were made of 
a successful intervention. 
Economic activity depends on reliable supply – not access only, as reliability affects the economic 
realm through income generating activities, business operations being able to stay open for longer 
durations through the day and thereby increasing the utilization of the installed capacity. Electricity 
lowers the burden and time required for household work, which has potential effects on labor 
supply decisions. Reliability of electricity affects capacity utilization and  rate of employment 
(Abbas & Choudhury, 2013). Wages and household income are affected by the ability to access 
and utilize available capital resources. If electrification is the backbone of inclusive development, 
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it should be considered a social good with positive externalities a reliable access to which should 
be a perennial right. 
An extensive literature1 exists on the relationship between electricity consumption and economic 
growth at national and household level across the developed and developing economies (Abbas & 
Choudhury, 2013; Bose & Shukla, 1999; Ferguson et al., 2000; Ghosh, 2002). Literature contains 
a wide range of findings on the correlations and the direction of causality and a majority of them 
support the growth hypothesis. At the household level, rural electrification is credited to providing 
numerous benefits for household welfare related to education, health care, productivity and quality 
of life (Rao, 2013). Reliable and continuity of electric supply economizes the time allocation to 
home production which could increase labour supply of adults, especially women in the household. 
Time saved from fuel collection for cooking can be used for entrepreneurial purposes, thereby 
increasing household consumption, income and assets. 
In rural areas, productivity improvement from the ability to reliably use household electric 
appliances, electric motors and technologies to generate mechanical power fosters livelihoods and 
provides income generating activities for small and medium enterprises. Although these benefits 
are self-evident, there is limited empirical quantitative evidence of these benefits at the household 
level owing to complex a link between electrification and development confounding the attempts 
to possible attributions. There have been recent attempts to quantitatively assess the impact of 
electrification, but evidence is mixed and often derived through confounding variables. Rao (2013) 
cites productivity related increases in income due to improved lighting in India and the Philippines, 
the positive impact on income is found as a return to education. Khandker et al. (2014) shows how 
rural electrification in India indirectly increases household per capita income through increases in 
labour supply of men and women, schooling of boys and girls and reduced poverty. 
This study examines the causal effects of differential effects of connectivity (access) and quality 
(intensity) of electricity on consumption expenditure, income, assets and poverty status. Since the 
extent of electricity utilization is endogenous to the household it is dependent on the household’s 
ability to afford the slack in the electricity distributed, we use a geographic instrumental variable. 
Mean access and hours of electricity at the village level are used as instruments as they directly 
 
1 See Table A4. 
4 
 
affect household demand for electricity through peer effects but is exogenous to household’s 
consumption demand for other goods, income, assets or status of poverty. 
We use a panel fixed effects instrumental variable (FE IV) and cross sectional two stage least 
square IV regression to examine the causal effect and explain between variations of access and 
quality of electricity. In order to check for robustness, we compare the FE IV results with FE and 
OLS results. In order to analyse the effect of electrification on poverty status we use a logistic 
fixed effect regression to obtain reliable estimates of the extent to which electrification affects 
movement out of poverty. The model uses controls including social networks of households, age, 
education, sex, household size, membership in credit and savings group, and access to banks which 
are believed to affect overall welfare of the household (Bisrat et al., 2012; Davies, 1999; 
Montgomery, 1991; Morgan & David, 1963). We find positive causal effect of service reliability 
on household consumption, income, assets, and additional hours of electricity has differential 
impacts in the transition out of poverty at differential margins of electricity availability. 
Electrification in India - The Context 
Over 1/3 of the 840 million people lacking access to electricity globally reside in India (United 
Nations Economic and Social Council, 2019). This figure underlines the scarcity and bottlenecks 
of energy supply and the inability of various households to afford electrification for the whole day. 
With only 5.4% electricity generated from renewable sources2, the supply gap is highest in India 
among the developing economies. India is dependent on the use of biomass in rural areas. Further, 
the country has the highest share of world annual consumption of biomass – 22% – significantly 
higher than that of other continental-size countries with similar social inequality. For the poor the 
demand for energy is limited and cooking accounts for 90% of the demand for energy. 
In 2005, the Government of India under the Ministry of Power launched the “Power for All” 
(National Electricity Policy) programme as a joint initiative of Government of India and all states 
(Nouni et al., 2008). The objective was to connect the unconnected in a phased manner by FY 
2018-2019. The objective was also to ensure 24x7 quality, reliable and affordable power supply 
to all domestic, commercial and industrial consumers, and provide adequate supply to agriculture 
consumers as per the state policy within a fixed time frame. Progress was laid out in a report from 
 
2 Data derived from World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2015. The estimate excludes electricity generated 
from hydroelectric source. See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.RNWX.ZS 
5 
 
Smart Power India (2019) which stated, between 2000-2016, “half a billion people gained access 
to electricity in India, increasing the share of grid-electrified households from 43% to 82%”.3 
On April 22, 2018, the Prime Minister tweeted “I am delighted that every single village of India 
now has electricity” (Doshi, 2018). As per the Government the problem of electrification is over 
with 99.8% of villages being electrified in 2019 (Saubhagya Report, 2019). However, the official 
Government definition is: “a village is electrified if the basic infrastructure is in place; power is 
being supplied to schools, health centres and other public places; and at least 10% of households 
are receiving electricity” (Nouni et al., 2008; Singh & Sundria, 2017). It may be argued that the 
policy focus has been on the extensive margin with a lack of impetus at the intensive margin, or a 
market failure in tapping the potential demand. 
Figure 1 panel (a) shows access and panel (b) shows hours of electricity in India in 20124 at the 
district level. Southern and Western India, along with Punjab in the North and Sikkim in the North 
East have high access (over 90% households electrified). In comparison to the data for 2005 (see 
Figure A.1), there seems to be a considerable improvement in access to electricity in the Southern 
and Western States in India. However, in terms of electricity hours only Kerela and Gujarat have 
had major improvements. 
There are large variations between and within states at the district level in terms of the hours of 
electricity. This is intriguing given that State governments, and not the district level authorities, 
are responsible for electricity dissemination in India. Figures 1 and A.1 motivate our question of 
how access differs from quality of supply and how this could affect household welfare. The states 
with highest access and hours of electricity have also been the fastest growing states in terms of 
the growth rate of gross state domestic product from 2005-2012 (Planning Commission, 2013), 
also shown by Rao (2013) for non-farm incomes in these states. In states such as Rajasthan, 
Jharkhand, Jammu & Kashmir and Madhya Pradesh, access was lower, but the hours of service 
were higher than the average of other states hinting at inequality and theft in electricity supply in 
these otherwise poorer states of India. In 2005, Jharkhand, access is available to 85%-95% of the 
population only, but whoever has access has over 80% of electricity hours in a day. 
 
3 In 2005, the govt. of India launched the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana, it is believed to have increased 
village electrification from 74% to 91% between 2005 and 2011. 
4 For comparison of the variables with 2005 data, see Figure A.1. 
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(a)                                                                  (b)  
Figure 1: Access and hours of electricity in India at the district level, 2012 
Source: India Human Development Survey 2012 
 
There is no official data on the intensity of electricity supply or electricity theft in India, hence, 
having access to electricity is a poor measure of actual supply given the amount of illegal use. 
Subsidy and theft have also led the public to run SEBS to operate with precarious financial 
positions, rendering them incapable of investing in needed infrastructural improvements, and thus 
unable to keep up with growing demand (Joseph, 2010). The first study by Rao (2013) on 
electricity intensity in India shows that the mean hour of electricity was at 15 hours a day in 2012, 
and almost 40% of the power generated is stolen or leaked from poorly insulated lines, because of 
decades of underinvestment in the grid (Denyer & Lakshmi, 2012). For instance, in the village of 
Fateh Nagla in Uttar Pradesh, India’s most-populated state and one of its poorest, about 250 
kilometres east of New Delhi, a dairy shop runs on a combination of solar power and a battery, 
while its three flour mills use diesel generators. In the afternoons, men wait for their turn to charge 
their mobile phones off a wire rigged up to an electric water pump. 
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Public private partnerships in electricity generation have not moved hand in hand. For example, 
Dabhol power plant near Mumbai in Maharashtra, established in 1992, as an FDI by Enron in the 
energy sector, failed and was closed down in 2001. The plant supplied to Maharashtra State 
Electricity Board (SEB), the board responsible for electricity distribution, but according to Joseph 
(2010) pricing issues rose as the charge for the power from the plant was higher than what the SEB 
paid to other state-run generating facilities. FDI agreement ended abruptly as the board had to 
supply electricity to agriculture and households at a subsidized rate it had to buy from other 
agencies. This has affected the business, trade and investment environment in India. 
Despite the efforts to provide access to all, India’s power supply has remained inadequate and 
unreliable. In 2014, more than 300 million Indians lived without electricity, of which 200 million 
lived in villages which were considered ‘electrified’ (World Bank, 2014). One might presume that 
in a vast country such as India, these numbers are a small market failure and along the path of 
progress, this issue will be automatically solved through electrification. However, a glance at India 
Human Development Index (IHDS) 2012 shows that the mean hours of electricity supply in rural 
India is approximately 13.5 hours a day, and exacerbated by major outages during peak periods 
(Joseph, 2010).5 
Table A4 summarises the previous studies on the nexus of electrification and economic growth 
and points to the lack of a longitudinal estimation on the effect of the reliability of electricity on 
household welfare. The gap in the examination of household electrification and its impact on 
households who gained more hours of electricity post the power sector reforms (2003) warrants 
an empirical study on the longitudinal effects of electrification and its quality on variables of 
household welfare. 
Section 2 describes the methodology and estimation strategy of the models used in the paper. 
Section 3 describes the data used in the study. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the 
analysis. Section 5 is conclusion. 
 
 
 
5 For a detailed pictorial representation of the hours of electrification at the state level in 2005 using the IHDS survey, 
see Figure A1, and Rao (p. 4, 2013). 
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2. Methodology 
2.1 The Theoretical Model 
The model developed in this study closely follows that of Kemmler (2007) on the choice of using 
electricity by rural households but at a longitudinal level. In this model households choose whether 
to use electricity based on the utility of the alternatives of using or not using electricity and the use 
of electricity depends upon the geographic conditions, household characteristics and the supply of 
electricity. The restricted utility is represented as: 
𝑈 = 𝑓(𝐺, 𝐻, 𝑆) 
where 𝐻 is a vector of household characteristics such as income, social network, education, 
household size, sex and age of household head. 𝑆 is a vector describing the attributes of electricity 
supply and 𝐺 is the vector of geographic demand variables. The attributes of electricity supply are 
described by using the price of electricity paid by households6, the percentages of forced outages 
as a measure of supply quality and community electrification. Following the definition of 
electricity as in the introduction, we assume if less than 10% of the households use electricity, the 
village is not electrified, and it is unlikely that the household has access to electricity. Villages 
having more than 10% of the households using electricity are considered as electrified. 
We consider the geographic demand variable 𝑆 with district dummies, this is because power 
outages are transformer and load based and hence, they can be localized at the district level. 
Kemmler (2007) used state dummies to capture the electricity tariff. Our analysis is at the local 
level given that electricity supply and tariffs are increasingly localized with privatization and 
private sector participation in the electricity market. Also power outages are mostly local owing to 
transformer or grid failure (Joseph, 2010). Following the enactment of Electricity Act '2003, a 
comprehensive change was undertaken through a market-oriented reform process. Restructuring 
and reformation have entailed formation of businesses such as GENCO (Generation Company), 
TRANSCO (Transmission Company), and DISCOM (distribution company) to improve the 
efficiency of the sector (Lahiri et al., 2010). 
 
6 In order to facilitate electricity access for the poor, the State Electricity Boards offer a minimum units of electricity 
at a subsidized tariff. This subsidized tariff is considered as the price of electricity in our model. Later we use the same 
price in the cost benefit analysis. 
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At any point of time 𝑡, a household 𝑖 chooses to use electricity if the utility derived from using it 
𝑈ଵ௧ is larger than the utility by not using it 𝑈଴௧. Following the random utility models, the net utility 
derived by household 𝑖 is expressed by the latent variable 𝑦௜௧∗  such that 
𝑦௜௧∗ = 𝑈௜ଵ௧ −  𝑈௜଴௧ > 0 → choose to use electricity and if 
𝑦௜௧∗ = 𝑈௜ଵ௧ −  𝑈௜଴௧ < 0 → choose to not use electricity 
𝑦௜௧∗ = 𝑋௜௧
ఉ + 𝑢௜௧ 
where 𝑢௜௧ = 𝜖௜ଵ௧ − 𝜖௜଴௧. 𝑋 is a vector of all the explanatory variables of 𝐺, 𝐻 and 𝑆. 𝛽 is a vector 
of the coefficients and 𝑢௜௧ is the stochastic capturing the uncertainty at any point in time. We 
hypothesize that these utility functions vary across income groups and regions as discussed in the 
introduction. 
We estimate the casual effect of electricity on household monthly consumption expenditure, real 
income, assets and status of poverty. We consider that these outcomes are conditional on electricity 
access and hours, the baseline panel fixed effects estimate is as follows: 
𝑌௜௝௧ = 𝛼௜௝ +  𝛽𝑋௜௝௧ + 𝛿𝑅௜௝௧ +  𝛾𝐸௜௝௧ + 𝜖௜௝௧              (1) 
where, 𝑌௜௝௧ denotes the outcome variable of interest, in our case the monthly consumption 
expenditure, real income and assets of the household 𝑖 in village 𝑗 at time 𝑡. 𝑋௜௝௧ is a vector of 
household observable demographic and socioeconomic characteristics such as size, social 
networks, loans, membership in credit associations of the household and head’s age, sex and 
education. 𝑅௜௝௧ is the hours of electricity in the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ household in the 𝑗 − 𝑡ℎ community in time 
𝑡 (0 to 24 hours in a day). Similarly, 𝐸௜௝௧ is access to electricity of the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ household in the 𝑗 −
𝑡ℎ community in time 𝑡 (1 for households with electricity access and 0 for those without). Panel 
fixed effects controls for unobserved household characteristics through the constant 𝛼௜௝. 𝜖௜௝௧ is the 
randomly distributed error term and 𝛽, 𝛾, and 𝛿 are unknown parameters to be estimated. The aim 
is to estimate the effect of access and hours of electricity, measured by the coefficients 𝛿 and 𝛾 
with two separate fixed effects regression for access and quality (hours). 
Assuming that there are economic incentives to use electricity, if villages were randomly selected 
for grid extension and household electrification occurred randomly, then an estimation of a panel 
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fixed effects model in Equation (1) would provide unbiased estimates of the impact of 
electrification. However, in India households are not randomly connected to electricity or villages 
are not randomly selected for electrification (Khandker et al., 2014). The decision is based on 
observed and unobserved characteristics, such as area topography, population density, populist 
policies, productive potential or a household's ability to perceive returns to investment. This leads 
to endogeneity of village- and household-level electricity connection. In the case of household 
electrification, endogeneity can manifest in various ways. It may be due to time varying omitted 
variable bias motivated by unobserved factors at the household level, or household perception 
about potential benefits of electricity leads to positive self-selection bias. Furthermore, there could 
be reverse causality with higher income leading to more hours of electricity. Endogeneity may also 
arise from simultaneity if household’s adoption of electricity and the outcome such as income are 
jointly determined (Khandker et al., 2014). Thus Equation (1) would yield biased impact estimates. 
In order to address this problem of endogeneity, we instrument the household's electricity-
connection decision. The first stage estimate of instrumental variables (IVs) is obtained by 
estimating the following demand equation for electricity access and hours of electricity 
𝐸௜௝௧ = 𝛼௜௝ +  𝛽𝑋௜௝௧ + 𝜃𝐼௜௝௧ + 𝜖௜௝௧              (2) 
𝑅௜௝௧ = 𝛼௜௝ +  𝛽𝑋௜௝௧ + 𝜃𝐼௜௝௧ + 𝜖௜௝௧              (3) 
where 𝐼௜௝௧ is the vector of instruments that only affect the demand for access Equation (2) and the 
quality of electricity Equation (3) by household 𝑖 in village 𝑗 in time 𝑡, but does not affect the 
outcomes of interest such as household monthly consumption expenditure, household income and 
assets. These outcomes are affected only indirectly through household’s access to electricity. 
For the instruments to be valid, two conditions are required; (i) 𝜃 is not a vector of zeros and (ii) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣൫𝐼௜௝௧ , 𝜖௜௝௧൯ = 0. The first condition implies that at least one instrument must significantly affect 
household’s decision to gain access to electricity or increase the demand for the hours of electricity. 
The second condition requires that the instruments only affect a household’s electrification 
decision and does not directly affect the outcome variables described above. 
We use the same instrument as Khandker et al. (2014), a vector of instruments that include the 
mean village level access and hours. The variable indicates the mean village level electricity access 
and hours for a household in a community (j) at time (t). The two instruments interact with 
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household observed characteristics as household head's age, gender, size, social network, loans 
and education. Proportion of households with access and hours of electricity serve as instruments 
because of peer pressure, conspicuous consumption or demonstration effects. Households tend to 
follow their neighbours or other associates in the village. If neighbours gain access or have access 
to more hours of electricity, then a household without electricity can signal lower socioeconomic 
standing, which households would be expected to avoid if they can afford it (Khandker et al., 
2014). We expect that the higher the percentage of connections and hours of electricity in a village, 
the higher is the likelihood of a household living in that village to adopt and acquire better 
electrification, provided the household can afford the connection fee and associated costs. 
The exogeneity condition for the instrument is expected to hold because mean village level access 
to electricity and hours of electricity should not directly affect household consumption 
expenditure, household income and assets, which depend on initial wealth, occupation, size and 
education among other characteristics of the household. Household’s income and expenditure do 
not depend on the mean village level electrification because household’s expenditure decision 
depends mainly on the size, and age composition rather than whether other households in the 
village have access to electricity or hours with electricity supply (Khandker et al., 2014). Khandker 
et al. (2014) also conduct a correlation between income, expenditure and instruments and find the 
correlation to be low to indicate any direct relationship between the instrument and the outcome. 
2.2 Estimation Strategy 
Our model follows the panel 2SLS fixed effects model by (Semykina & Wooldridge, 2010). We 
do not reject the hypothesis of no selection bias and allow for arbitrary correlation between the 
unobserved effect and the explanatory variables. We use fixed effects Instrumental variables 
regression (FE-IV), which is robust to correlations between unobserved effects and explanatory 
and instrumental variables. The model does not require specification of the reduced form equations 
for endogenous variables and makes no assumptions of errors distribution. At the heart of our 
model is the within transformation of the variable. The form of the model is as in Equation (4) 
𝑦௜௧ = 𝑌௜௧𝛾 + 𝑋ଵ௜௧𝛽 + 𝛼௜௝ + 𝑣௜௧ 
                             𝑦௜௧ =  𝑍௜௧𝛿 + 𝛼௜௝ + 𝑣௜௧ ,       𝑡 = 1, 2         𝑖 = 1,2, … . . , 𝑁    (4) 
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where 𝑦௜௧ is the dependent variable. For our study we use monthly per capita consumption 
expenditure, real income and assets of the household to proxy household welfare. 
𝑌௜௧ is either a dummy (access to electricity), or a continuous variable (hours of electricity), and 
these variables are allowed to be correlated with the 𝑣௜௧. 𝑋ଵ௜௧ is a 1 x 𝑘ଵvector of observations of 
the exogenous variables included as control variables. 𝑍௜௧ = [𝑌௜௧𝑋௜௧]; 𝛾 is the coefficient of 
interest, 𝛽 is a 1 x 𝑘ଵ vector of coefficients for the controls, 𝛼௜௝ is the unobserved effect, 𝑣௜௧ are 
the idiosyncratic errors. 𝛿 is a 𝐾 ×  1 vector of coefficients, where 𝐾 = 1 + 𝑘ଵ. 
We use demographic and socio-economic characteristics as controls: education, sex, age, social 
network, loans and membership in savings and credit associations as socio-economic controls. 
Panel fixed captures the time invariant characteristics such as district and caste fixed among others. 
In order to allow for correlation between the regressors and the idiosyncratic errors, we assume 
the existence of instruments, 𝑧௜௧, which are strictly exogenous conditional on 𝛼௜, which captures 
the time invariant characteristics. This permits for unspecified correlation between 𝑧௜௧ and 𝛼௜, but 
requires 𝑧௜௧ to be uncorrelated with {𝑢௜௥ : r = 1, ..., T} (Semykina & Wooldridge, 2010). 
We allow some elements of 𝑋ଵ௜  to be correlated with the idiosyncratic errors, as occurs in 
simultaneous equation models with measurement errors and time varying omitted variables. Our 
instruments are the mean village level, as also used by (Rao (2013) and Khandker et al. (2014). In 
addition to the instrumenting by electricity access, we use the mean level of electricity hours at the 
village level as an additional instrument.  
Our sample has approximately 30-35 households per village. Hence, we assume that there is 
enough variation at the geographic level to consider the IV we use. Moreover, following Rao 
(2013) and Khandker et al. (2014), we assume the existence of geographic instruments 𝑧௜௧, which 
are strictly exogenous conditional on 𝛼௜. The underlying logic of the IV is that the mean level of 
electricity at the village level has peer pressure effects on the household’s decision to acquire 
electricity but it does not affect the household’s consumption, income, assets and standard of 
living. This permits for unspecified correlation between 𝑧௜௧ and 𝛼௜. Since FE estimator involves 
time-demeaning, we assume that all variables in 𝑋ଵ௜௧ and 𝑧௜௧ are time-varying. 
 
 
13 
 
3. Data 
We use the panel data of IHDS from 2005-2012 thereby making the analysis longitudinal rather 
than cross-sectional to capture the within and between variations. Using a panel allows to capture 
the household time invariant characteristics and compare it to OLS for IHDS 2012 with district 
and caste fixed effects to provide a robust picture. IHDS 2005 and 2012 are merged to obtain an 
unbalanced panel with 83% of observations matched, similar matches have been found in previous 
studies using IHDS panel. (i) We use the binary of electrification to study the extensive margin 
and (ii) hours of electricity (0-24) for the intensive margin. The effects of interest for household 
welfare are: Monthly per capita consumption expenditure, real income, assets, and poverty status 
of households. For assets, we undertake an unweighted asset category and principal component 
analysis of household and productive assets. A cost-benefit analysis is then carried out with the 
coefficient of explanatory variables for real income at the intensive margins. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics at the national level between 2005 and 2012. IHDS 1, 2005 
has 42,045 households and IHDS 2, 2012 has 42,144 households. Not all households are tracked 
in both survey waves, hence the unbalanced with 83% households matched. The survey is rich in 
terms of multi-dimensional aspects of human development and provides adequate covariates as 
controls thereby, explaining a larger variation in the outcome of interest in terms of household 
welfare. We extract data on household income, head’s age, sex, education, household size, caste, 
social networks and participation in credit cooperatives and loans from banks which could affect 
household consumption, income, assets and status of poverty. The data is tracked at the village 
level allowing for control of unobserved variation at caste and district level. 
There is a 9% increase in access between 2005 and 2012. However, in terms of hours of electricity 
at national level, there is a 0.4 hours decrease in the availability. Mean hours of electricity for the 
poor during the best of economic times has also decreased. This is also the case for the same group 
of households when we track them in the two surveys. Although there has been considerable 
attempt to increase electricity supply, the impetus seems to have been on provision of access and 
not the continuity (quality) of electricity. In rural areas mean hours of electricity have stagnated 
between 13-14 hours a day in the reference period. On the other hand, cost of electricity to 
households per month almost doubled in the reference period from Rs. 148 to Rs. 280, partly due 
to tariff rebalancing and privatization of electricity supply geared towards cost recovery. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, India Human Development Survey 2005-2012  
  2005 2012  
  Obs. Mean sd Obs. Mean sd p-value 
Per capita Exp./Month (Rs) 39302 973.56 1039.86 42122 2422.07 31593.61 *** 
Income per capita/Annual (Rs.) 39302 12089.82 20909.77 42145 29403.00 53998.72 *** 
Assets (0-29) 39302 12.51 6.22 42122 15.44 6.64 ** 
Poor (0/1) 39302 0.19 0.39 42122 0.16 0.37 * 
Household Head Edu. Years 39302 7.65 5.09 42134 8.30 5.10 * 
Household Head Age 39302 47.10 13.47 42139 49.71 13.57  
Household Head Sex (1-male, 2-
female) 39302 1.10 0.30 42139 1.14 0.35 
 
Electricity Access (0/1) 39302 0.79 0.42 41981 0.87 0.33 ** 
Electricity Hours/Day 24751 15.74 7.13 36588 15.23 6.87  
Electricity Cost/Monthly (Rs.) 39302 148.25 239.34 36458 280.19 428.13 *** 
Free Electricity 39302 0.10 0.30 42145 0.09 0.28  
State Electricity Bill/Company  39302 0.65 0.47 42145 0.64 0.48  
Social network HH (0/1) 38714 0.36 0.48 42049 0.27 0.25 *** 
Urban (0/1) 39302 0.38 0.48 42145 0.36 0.48  
Illegal Electricity (0/1)       42145 0.05 0.22  
  2005 2012 
  Obs.  Mean sd Obs. Mean sd 
Electricity Access (0/1) 22814 0.79 0.18 29269 0.88 0.32 
Hours of Electricity/Day 22814 15.67 7.17 25713 15.27 6.89 
Social Network 22502 0.39 0.49 29308 0.07 0.25 
Urban 22814 0.39 0.49 29375 0.34 0.47 
Source: Author elaboration using India Human Development Survey 2005-2012 
Rs. is Indian National Rupee 
 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1. The Extensive Margins 
The results for the impact of access on monthly per capita consumption expenditure are presented 
in Table 27. The results of the first stage regression are significant at 1%. Coefficient of access to 
electricity is significant with the fixed effects regression specification (1) and the instrumental 
variable fixed effect regression (2) at the national level. The coefficient is higher with the 
instrumental variables (IV) regression, showing that moving from no access to having access 
increases the monthly consumption expenditure by 60%. The IV regression shows a negative 
selection bias in our model. Households with higher monthly per capita consumption would likely 
 
7 First stage regression for access and hours of electricity is in Table A2. 
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have access to electricity from various sources. Better off households have access to generators, 
inverters or might have a VIP connection line which is common. Access has a significant effect in 
rural areas and the results are robust as shown in specifications (3) and (4) in Table 1. In urban 
areas, the panel fixed effect regression is significant and has an effect of 6%, whereas the IV 
regression has a very strong effect on monthly consumption expenditure in urban areas, but the 
effect is not significant. 
Table 2: Extensive Margin- Panel Regression - Impact of access on  
Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Fixed 
Effects-All 
Fixed 
Effects-
IVAll 
Fixed 
Effects 
Rural 
Fixed 
Effects-IV 
Rural 
Fixed 
Effects 
Urban 
Fixed Effects-
IV Urban 
Electricity 0.08*** 0.60*** 0.08*** 0.56** 0.06** 0.78*** 
 (0.01) (0.19) (0.01) (0.22) (0.02) (0.07) 
Log Real Income 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household Head Education 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household Head Sex -0.04*** -0.03** -0.03 -0.02 -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Household Head Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household Size -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Social Network 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Loan Banks 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Membership ROSCA 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.03* 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Year 0.88*** 0.82*** 0.90*** 0.82*** 0.84*** 0.80*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Constant 5.96*** 5.65*** 6.06*** 5.79*** 5.65*** 4.92*** 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.06) (0.14) (0.10) (0.50) 
Observations 55,695 55,469 35,786 35,786 18,341 18,341 
R-squared 0.690  0.691  0.690  
Number of id 29,338 29,112 18,428 18,428 9,342 9,342 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We use two instruments as treatments, the local average of electricity (dummy) at the district level, 
and the local average of electricity hours (in a day) at the district level. The coefficient on 
instrumental variable regression at the all India level shows that: as household moves from no 
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access to having access, there is a 60% increase in the monthly per capita consumption in rupees. 
Comparison of the panel and the instrumental variable regression supports the negative self-
selection argument discussed above, household with higher consumption tends to have higher 
access to electricity. The coefficient of rural and urban areas shows that as household gains 
electricity, its monthly consumption increases by 0.56% and 0.78% respectively. This coefficient 
reflects the importance of access to electricity. 
Since we have an unbalanced panel, the matching of households is approximately 83% in Table 1. 
Our model captures 69% of the variation in monthly consumption expenditure. Real income is, as 
expected, significant in all specifications and has a stronger effect in urban areas. Household head’s 
education significantly determines consumption, but the magnitude is 1% across all specifications. 
Household head’s age is insignificant, while having female-headed households seems to have a 
negative effect on monthly consumption overall and in urban areas, but the results are not 
significant in rural areas. 
Social network in terms of having membership in rotating savings and credit associations, or 
acquaintances with a government official outside community has a strong positive effect on 
consumption expenditure which highlights the server effect of social interactions. However, as 
noted in the summary statistics, social network has been decreasing among households across the 
two surveys. Loan from banks also has a strong positive effect on consumption expenditure. The 
time period from 2005-2012 has had a strong positive effect on household consumption 
expenditure which signifies the rapid economic growth registered during this period, GDP growth 
rate 9% approx. per annum (Planning Commission, 2013) and its possible trickle downs at the 
household level. 
Table 3 shows the result of panel fixed effects and instrumental variable regressions for poor rural 
and poor urban households. The effect of access on monthly per capita consumption expenditure 
for the poor in both rural and urban areas are positive. In specifications (2) and (4) the coefficients 
0.37 and 0.48 of the IV regressions show that the impact on consumption expenditure in rural and 
urban areas for the poor is strong and significant at 1%. A comparison of the results of fixed effects 
and fixed effects IV regression shows that there is a negative selection bias in the model, that is, 
household with higher monthly per capita expenditure can by themselves meet the need for 
electricity through other means, e.g. inverters and generators. 
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Table 3: Extensive Margin- Effect of electricity on monthly per capita consumption for  
the poor in rural and urban India, 2005-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Fixed Effects 
Poor Urban  
Fixed Effects-IV- 
 Poor Urban 
Fixed Effects-  
Poor Rural  
Fixed Effects-IV 
Poor Rural 
Electricity 0.06 0.37*** 0.05** 0.48*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.39) 
Log Real Income 0.08 0.07 0.05*** 0.04*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household Head Education 0.01** 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household Head Sex 0.05 0.04 -0.06* -0.06 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) 
Household Head Age -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household Size -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Social Network 0.07* 0.07 0.07** 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
Loan Banks 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Membership ROSCA -0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) 
Year 0.69*** 0.65*** 0.91*** 0.80*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.10) 
Constant 5.17*** 5.03*** 5.31*** 5.17*** 
 (0.57) (0.58) (0.13) (0.21) 
Observations 2,720 2,720 6,712 6,712 
R-squared 0.748  0.856  
Number of id 2,248 2,248 5,470 5,470 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4 shows the effect of access on the non-poor in urban and rural area. The effect of access for 
both rural and urban non-poor is positive, and the coefficients are significant at 1%. Our results 
corroborate and provide evidence of the likelihood of such an event. It is very unlikely that a non-
poor household would not have electricity in urban areas. However, if it is the case, the impact of 
access is such that monthly per capita consumption expenditure (mpce) would increase by 81%, 
but such an event is unlikely, and so is insignificant. On the other hand, the effect of access for the 
non-poor in a rural is a 53% increase in monthly consumption expenditure. 
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Table 4: Extensive Margin - Effect of electricity on monthly per capita consumption for  
Non-poor in rural and urban India, 2005-2012 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.2. The Intensive Margins 
Table 5 shows the effect of one additional hour of electricity on the monthly per capita 
consumption expenditure for all areas, rural areas and the poor. The coefficients are significant for 
all households, rural households and households that are poor. The model exhibits a negative self-
selection bias underlining the theory that households whose consumption expenditures are high 
show a preference for more electricity hours as they can always afford it. The IV results are 
significant for all specifications. In all areas, there is a 4% increase in mpce associated with an 
additional hour of electricity service, ceteris paribus. The effects are equally strong for both poor 
and non-poor in rural areas and the poor in both rural and urban areas. One more hour of electricity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Fixed Effects- 
Non-Poor 
Urban 
Fixed Effects-IV- 
Non-Poor Urban 
Fixed Effects-Non-
Poor Rural  
Fixed Effects-
IV-Non-Poor 
Rural 
Electricity 0.05 0.81 0.06*** 0.53*** 
 (0.04) (0.80) (0.01) (0.20) 
Log Real Income 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household Head Education 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household Head Sex -0.04 -0.05 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Household Head Age 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household Size -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Social Network 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Loan Banks 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.06***  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)  
Membership ROSCA 0.03 0.04* 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year 0.81*** 0.79*** 0.90*** 0.85*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
Constant 5.98*** 5.10*** 6.29*** 5.99*** 
 (0.11) (0.68) (0.07) (0.14) 
Observations 15,621 15,621 29,074 29,074 
R-squared 0.685  0.710  
Number of id 8,830 8,830 17,046 17,046 
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implies a 3% increase in the mpce for the poor and a 3 % increase in mpce for a household in a 
rural area. 
These results corroborate with the summary statistics in Table A1. For both years, on an average, 
poor have 14 hours of electricity and hence an additional hour means a 3% increase in mpce. 
Similarly, in rural areas the average is 13 hours and so one more hour means a 3% increase in 
mpce. All control variables exhibit expected sign and significance. 
Table 5: Intensive Margin- Panel Regression- Impact of having one more hour of electricity on Monthly 
Per Capita Consumption Expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FE FE-IV FE Rural FE-IV Rural FE Poor FE-IV Poor 
Electricity Hours 0.00 0.04** 0.00 0.03* 0.00*** 0.03** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
Log real income 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.06** 0.06** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Household Head Edu. 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household Head Sex -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03 -0.05** 0.04 0.05 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household Head Age 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household size -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Social network 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) 
Loan banks 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) 
Membership ROSCA 0.05*** 0.03* 0.06*** 0.04* 0.04 0.06 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Year 0.89*** 0.91*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.85*** 0.83*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 5.98*** 5.45*** 6.12*** 5.76*** 5.17*** 4.88*** 
 (0.06) (0.25) (0.07) (0.21) (0.28) (0.33) 
Observations 47,358 47,358 28,822 28,822 6,948 6,948 
R-squared 0.685  0.685  0.818  
Number of id 26,655 26,655 16,478 16,478 6,058 6,058 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.3. Robustness Check with Cross Section Data 
Table 6 shows a cross section model for the year 2012. We aim to examine the effect of an 
additional hour of electricity on real income. Since in India, real income is dependent on time 
invariant characteristics such as caste and geography, we control for these time invariant 
characteristics. The effect of an additional hour of electricity on income is significant and positive 
for all specifications and the results are robust for a varying number of observations and across all 
specifications. The effect is strongest in urban areas, which is as expected, trade and commerce 
thrives on electricity in urban areas, and an extra hour of electricity means a lot. The negative 
selection bias is evident at the cross-sectional level but weaker than the panel regressions. 
Table 6: OLS and 2SLS-IV- Impact of having more electricity on Log Real Income 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES OLS-All IV-All IV-Poor IV-Non-Poor IV-Rural IV-Urban IV-Rural Poor 
        
Electricity Hours 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.14*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) 
Household Head Educ. 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Household Head Sex -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.08** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.18 -0.07* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.04) 
Household Head Age 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01** -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household Size 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.14*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
Social Network 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.03 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.19 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.05) 
Forward Caste -0.05** -0.05** 0.02 -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.15 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.13) (0.04) 
Other Backward Caste -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.04) 
Scheduled Caste/Tribe 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.05 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.00 0.05 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.15) (0.05) 
Bus Stop in Area -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.48** 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.02) 
Investment Banks 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.08*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.10 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.03) 
Constant 9.84*** 9.82*** 8.20*** 9.81*** 9.81*** 8.82*** 8.17*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.47) (0.13) (0.13) (0.54) (0.47) 
District FE 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 
Observations 21,560 21,560 3,644 17,912 20,815 745 3,549 
R-squared 0.331 0.331 0.396 0.326 0.329 0.133 0.400 
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For all areas, an increase in one hour of electricity increases real income by 1% in both the OLS 
and the IV fixed effects. For the poor in both rural and urban areas there is a 2% increase in real 
income with an additional hour of electricity. The effect is somewhat weaker for the non-poor at 
1%. Interestingly the strongest effect of this specification among the caste is for the schedule 
tribe/caste, which are concentrated in the Eastern and North-Eastern areas with highest hours of 
load shedding with maximum gap without subsidy (pfcindia report, 2016). However, in recent 
years the impetus on energy sales has led to an astounding 16% increase in revenue in 2016 
(pfcindia report, 2016). 
Table 7 shows the effect of access and hours of electricity on unweighted assets. Moving from no 
access to having access increases assets by 9 more assets. Note that household assets range from 
0-29, see Table A3 for the effects of electrification through a Principal Component Analysis of 
household assets. On the other hand, an additional hour of electricity has differential effects on 
asset creation depending on the margins of electricity deficiency. Households with less than 8 
hours of electricity tend to gain more assets with electrification as compared to households with 
less than 12 and 16 hours of electricity. 
For households with less than 8 hours of electricity an additional hour means nearly half more of 
an asset. When we do not restrict the electricity hours, an additional hour of electricity implies a 
0.08 unit increase in the number of assets for the households. Although, it is not sound to compare 
unweighted assets to wealth of households, it gives a fair analysis of the impact of electricity on 
household wealth. All control variables exhibit expected sign and significance. Also, the negative 
selection is picked up by the asset’s regression showing that households with higher assets have 
better electricity access and more hours of electricity. 
Table 8 shows that electrification has had a positive and significant effect on household poverty 
reduction. We could categorize households with less than 8 hours as being acutely electricity 
deficient. In specification 1 we find that access to electricity increases the probability of moving 
out of poverty by 22%. From specification 2 onwards we focus on the impact of hours of electricity 
on poverty in rural areas with different hours of electricity access. An increase in hours of 
electricity increases the probability of moving out of poverty by 2%. This coefficient is identical 
for rural areas also. For households with less than 8 hours of electricity a day, an additional hour 
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of electricity implies a 10% probability of moving out of poverty. As expected, the coefficient is 
smaller: 5% with 12 or less hours of electricity and 3% probability for 16 or less hours of service. 
Table 7: Fixed Effects and IV- Impact of Electricity on Unweighted Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FE-All FE-IV All FE All FE-IV All FE-All 
Electricity<8 
hours 
FE-All-IV 
Electricity<8 hours 
Electricity 1.97*** 9.34***     
 (0.06) (1.71)     
Log Real Income 0.65*** 0.55*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) 
Household Head Educ. 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Household Head Sex -0.24*** -0.18* -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.31) (0.32) 
Household Head Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household Size 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11** 0.13** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) 
Social Network 0.16*** -0.32*** 0.45*** 0.41*** 0.49** 0.26 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (0.19) (0.25) 
Loan Banks 0.34*** 0.39*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30 0.37* 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.21) (0.22) 
Membership ROSCA 0.61*** 0.64*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.39 0.23 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.31) (0.34) 
Year 3.31*** 2.43*** 3.87*** 3.81*** 3.55*** 2.61*** 
 (0.03) (0.21) (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.67) 
Electricity hours   0.04*** 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.49** 
   (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.22) 
Constant 2.51*** -1.90* 3.64*** 3.30*** 3.08*** 2.91*** 
 (0.28) (1.08) (0.30) (0.34) (1.03) (1.06) 
Observations 55,696 55,470 52,199 52,199 13,075 13,075 
R-squared 0.580  0.605  0.588  
Number of id 29,339 29,113 28,653 28,653 11,510 11,510 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results from the extensive and the intensive margins of electrification highlight the relative 
usefulness of electricity for different income levels and different regions. The findings show that 
access and each additional hour of electricity has a different usefulness for people who are poor, 
middle class, and the rich in rural and urban areas. An additional hour, in general, means more 
(stronger effect on real income) for the poor than the non-poor, more usefulness for an urban poor 
as compared to the rural poor. An additional hour means more for an urban household as compared 
to a rural household. This highlights the relative importance of electrification in urban areas with 
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more opportunities attached to electrification as compared to rural areas where the role of 
electrification is limited to cooking and lighting. 
Table 8: Logit Fixed Effects: Impact of Electricity on Status of Poverty 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All All Rural Rural 
Electricity 
Hours < 8 
Rural Electricity 
Hours < 12 
Rural Electricity 
Hours < 16 
Electricity 0.22***      
 (0.06)      
Log Real Income 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.35*** 0.20* 0.25*** 0.29*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) 
Household Head 
Education 
0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05* 0.05** 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Household Head Sex -0.37*** -0.33*** -0.30** 0.39 -0.22 -0.17 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.39) (0.26) (0.21) 
Household Head Age 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02* 0.02** 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household Size -0.52*** -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.43*** -0.52*** -0.46*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) 
Social Network 0.60*** 0.59*** 0.68*** 0.66** 0.70*** 0.62*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.29) (0.18) (0.14) 
Year 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.00 -0.40* -0.02 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.22) (0.12) (0.09) 
Membership ROSCA 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.11 -0.16 -0.09 -0.02 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.40) (0.26) (0.19) 
Loan Banks 0.15* 0.14* 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.32) (0.19) (0.15) 
Electricity Hours  0.01*** 0.02*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 11,648 9,476 6,074 674 1,658 2,678 
Number of id 5,824 4,738 3,037 337 829 1,339 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Condition for categorizing a household as poverty changed between 2005-2012, as per the level of inflation 
(Consumer Price Index) and the  report of the Tendulkar Committee report (Krishna, 2009). Our model adjusts 
for the revised poverty standard line by using poor category across year. 
 
On the other hand, access to electricity is more important (stronger effect on monthly per capita 
consumption expenditure) for households in urban areas than in rural areas, while it means more 
to a poor rural household than a poor urban household. In areas with acute electricity deficiency, 
an additional hour has stronger effects on poverty reduction which signifies the role of 
electrification and the lack thereof in reducing absolute poverty. 
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Social networks and real income are the two other determining factors in transitioning out of 
poverty. The cost benefit analysis in Table 9 shows a large cost benefit difference using the 
coefficients of the IV regressions as the magnitude of benefit and the monthly price paid as 
electricity bill as the cost.8 The table shows the cost and benefit in income of adding one hour of 
electricity at the margin of electricity deficiency. High income households have the highest benefit 
from an additional hour of electricity - five times worth the cost of an additional hour. The net 
benefit to the poor per hour of electricity is Rs. 0.55, while for the middle class it is Rs. 1.724 and 
for the rich it is Rs 4.341. The gap between the benefits and costs declines with income levels. 
Table 9: Cost benefit Analysis from two sources of electricity 
Income Level SEB/Company Illegal 
Monthly Cost Benefit Cost  Benefit 
All Categories 0.84 2.368 0.103 1.376 
Poor 0.652 1.199 0.059 0.859 
Middle Class 0.88 2.604 0.157 2.104 
Comfortable 1.381 5.722 0.423 3.63 
Source: Authors Elaboration using IHDS 2005-2012 
Note: Units is Rs. Price of electricity per hour is derived using 2012 prices and the marginal 
benefits are the coefficients of the fixed effect IV regressions 
 
For the poor, the benefits are almost twice as much as they pay if the supply is from the state 
electricity board. Interestingly, the benefits are ten times the cost if the electricity is from a stolen 
connection which justifies the argument of rampant theft of electricity posed by Joseph (2010). 
For the middle class, it is three times what they pay. Strong ascending correlation between price 
and benefit suggests that each hour of electricity demand is valued more than the price charged for 
each additional hour at the going rate. Hence, a progressive pricing and calculated price 
discriminations for the poor and the well-off could help achieve the goal of complete 
electrification. 
As India lags behind in renewable energy, these results are positive signs for distributors to 
understand the benefit of an additional hour of service to the consumer. This analysis reflects on 
 
8 We use the actual prize paid by individuals at the household level to estimate the cost of electricity for an additional 
hour. Although the prices are subsidized, we can understand the gap in the benefits and costs at the subsidized rate. 
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the ongoing issue in evaluating the impact of  electricity common China, Brazil and in other major 
developing economies (Pereira et al., 2011). 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the relationship between electrification and household welfare in India 
during 2005-2012 using panel/cross-section fixed effects regression and logistic regression. We 
analyse the causal impact of electrification on monthly per capita consumption expenditure, real 
income, household and other assets and the status of poverty. Our results show that access to 
electricity is crucial for household welfare in urban and rural areas, especially for the poor. 
At the extensive margin there is an increase of more than 50% in the monthly consumption 
expenditure of households with electricity access in rural areas. Poor in urban areas have 37% 
increase in consumption expenditure with access to electricity. Non-poor in rural areas have a 53% 
increase in consumption expenditure with electricity access. At the intensive margin, an increase 
in the hour of electricity means a 4% increase in the monthly consumption expenditure of the 
overall population. One additional hour of electricity increases the monthly consumption 
expenditure of rural households by 3% and for the poor households by 3%. In terms of income, an 
additional hour of electricity increases urban household’s real income by 14%, real income of rural 
poor by 2% and real income of poor in both areas by 2%. 
Access and hours of electrification has also far-reaching impact on building household assets and 
transitioning out of poverty. Having access to electricity increases household assets by 9 units on 
a scale of 0-29. An additional hour of electricity for those with less than 8 hours of electricity in a 
day increases assets by 0.48 (nearly half an asset). Access to electricity increases household assets 
by 2.72 units and an additional hour of electricity increases household assets by 0.17 units. Access 
to electricity also seems to have a significant impact on poverty reduction especially in rural areas 
and among those who are deprived of good quality electricity. Having access to electricity 
improves the probability of transitioning out of poverty by 22%. An additional hour of electricity 
for households with less than 8 hours of service improves the probability of transitioning out of 
poverty by 10%, 5% for households with access less than 12 hours, and 3% for households with 
access less than 16 hours. 
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We find that electrification is vital for meeting the growing demand for electricity and we reassert 
the need to move beyond counting the connections (Aklin et al., 2016) to household welfare in 
India. The socio-economic effects of electrification can be estimated if different dimensions of 
access are measured. The results assert a strong and almost linear association between hours of 
supply and household welfare in the five realms of welfare studied. Our results suggest that this 
indicator should be prioritized in studies of access. This finding has implications for efforts such 
as the Global Tracking Framework (GTF), which has made important contributions by re-
conceptualizing electricity access as multi-dimensional.  
The results testify to the importance of multi-dimensional approaches that measure access on a 
multi-tiered scale, instead of simply classifying households as connected or non-connected. This 
approach can be used to analyse measures of access in surveys, avoiding the need to collapse the 
data at the mean village or district level. For social scientists, our study provides a steppingstone 
in developing comparable measures of access, and energy access more generally, and apply in 
other countries. 
Aklin et al. (2016) state that if policy interventions increase the daily duration of supply at a low 
cost, the benefits to the population are potentially large. Our analysis shows that there is a 
significant difference between the benefit and costs of electricity for households. Hence, there is 
potential to tap the effective demand from the consumers point of view. Overall, the situation for 
policy makers is intriguing. Households need electricity as it has multifaceted spill overs at the 
micro and the macro socio-economy of the state and the nation. Electricity has to be provided 
though not as a freebie, users need to understand the price to pay in terms of the resources forgone. 
The results highlight the importance of considering quality in energy poverty research. Household 
electricity connections are a natural focus in early efforts in rural electrification, but the rapid 
extension of national grids, and the spread of off-grid alternatives, necessitates focus on service 
quality. We find a robust association between access and number of hours of service available and 
household welfare. Electrification improve lives and hence a sustained effort to understand and 
contribute to increase service quality should be a priority, especially in severely affected areas. 
Settling down with access is a policy sleep once from which they have to awaken. 
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Appendices 
Source: IHDS 2005-2012 
 
  
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for households with and without electricity for 2005 and 2012 
   
 No Electricity No-Electricity 
 2005 2012 
 Obs. Mean sd Obs. Mean sd 
Monthly Per Capita 
Consumption 
Expenditure (Rs) 5543 525.15 398.87 3495 1227.60 1447.68 
Real Income (Rs) 5543 22226.86 23123.84 3496 30496.30 34828.89 
Assets (0-29) 5543 5.50 2.70 3496 6.71 3.05 
Non-Poor 5543 0.64 0.48 3495 0.64 0.48 
Household head 
Education 5543 3.99 4.24 3496 4.28 4.51 
Household Head Age 5543 44.88 13.45 3496 49.51 13.06 
Household Head Sex 5543 1.11 0.32 3496 1.18 0.38 
Loan Banks 5543 0.07 0.25 3496 0.11 0.31 
Membership Credit 
and Savings Group 5543 0.06 0.24 3495 0.04 0.19 
Social Network 5453 0.15 0.35 3491 0.03 0.16 
Urban 5543 0.10 0.30 3496 0.08 0.28 
       
 With Electricity With Electricity 
 2005 2012 
 Obs. Mean sd Obs. Mean sd 
Monthly Per Capita 
Consumption 
Expenditure (Rs) 21958 1039.64 1050.83 25762 2452.87 2856.61 
Real Income (Rs) 21958 58010.48 85353.68 25773 81256.47 135797.78 
Assets (0-29) 21958 13.81 5.57 25761 16.99 5.96 
Non-Poor 21958 0.85 0.35 25762 0.86 0.35 
Household head 
Education 21958 8.25 4.91 25768 9.02 4.96 
Household Head Age 21958 47.05 13.17 25769 51.56 12.41 
Household Head Sex 21958 1.09 0.29 25769 1.15 0.35 
Loan Banks 21958 0.13 0.33 25773 0.20 0.40 
Membership Credit 
and Savings Group 21930 0.07 0.26 25730 0.13 0.33 
Urban 21958 0.40 0.49 25773 0.38 0.48 
Electricity Hours 21958 16.19 6.68 25712 15.27 6.89 
Social Network 21672 0.40 0.49 25716 0.07 0.26 
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Table A2: First Stage Results of Instrumental Variable Regression with 2SLS dependent variable: 
Monthly per capita consumption expenditure 
VARIABLES FE  
Electricity 
 (0/1) 
MPCE 
FE 
Hours of 
Electricity 
(0/24) 
   
Mean Village Level of Electricity Access 0.56***  
 (0.09)  
Mean Village Level Electricity Hours  0.95*** 
(0.01) 
Log Real Income 0.01*** 0.09*** 
 (0.00) (0.05) 
Household Head Education 0.00*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Household Head Sex -0.00 0.27* 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Household Head Age 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Household Size 0.00*** 0.02 
 (0.00) (0.02) 
Social Network 0.06*** 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 
F statistic  189.3 394.64 
Corr (u_i, Xb) 0.29 -0.10 
Observations 55,469 47356 
Group 
R Square 
1.9 
0.38 
1.8 
0.57 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3: Principal Component Analysis of Household Assets:  
Impact of electrification on household Assets 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Fixed Effects 
Household Assets 
Fixed Effects-IV 
Household Assets 
Fixed Effects 
Household Assets 
Fixed Effects-IV 
Household Assets 
Electricity Access (0/1) 0.40*** 2.72**   
 (0.06) (1.07)   
Log real income 0.05*** 0.03** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Household Head 
Education 
0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household Head Sex 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.09** 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Household Head Age 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household size 0.01** 0.02** 0.01* 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Social network 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Loan banks -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Membership ROSCA -0.06* -0.10*** -0.06** -0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 
Year 0.04** 0.07*** 0.00 0.08* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Electricity hours   0.02*** 0.15** 
   (0.00) (0.06) 
Constant -0.58*** -3.32*** -1.29*** -3.17*** 
 (0.15) (0.96) (0.14) (0.93) 
Observations 42,264 42,264 38,771 38,771 
R-squared 0.023  0.030  
Number of id 29,016 29,016 25,997 25,997 
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Table A4: Summary Literature Review 
 
9 Note: US India exchange rate in 2008 in $ terms was Rs. 49/$ on April 2008. 
 Purpose Methodology Sample and Time Frame Relevant Findings 
Ferguson 
et al. 
(2000) 
Examine the correlations 
between electricity 
consumption/capita and 
GDP/capita and between 
total primary energy 
supply/capita (e/E) and 
GDP/capita 
Correlations 100 countries (1960-
1995) 
Strong correlation between electricity 
use and wealth creation. Stronger for 
wealthy countries than do poor 
countries. In wealthy countries, 
increase in wealth over time correlates 
with increases in the proportion of 
energy used in the form of electricity. 
Rao 
(2013) 
Examine the effect of 
electricity hours on the 
income of non-farm 
enterprises 
Linear regression 
with an instrument 
variable (village 
electrification rate) 
and propensity-
score matching with 
multiple treatment 
levels 
41554 households 
India Human 
Development Survey 
(IHDS), 2012 
 
Aggregate income impact across 
existing non-farm enterprises of 
improving electricity supply to 16 
hours a day has been in the order of 
0.1% of GDP 
Khandker 
et al. 
(2014) 
Examine the average and 
distributional effects of 
electrification (binary) 
on household welfare 
Linear Regressions 
with an 
instrumental 
variable (village 
electrification rates) 
Rural Households in 
India 22675 
 
IHDS, 2005 
Rural electrification reduces fuel 
collection time for boys and girls and 
increases the time allocated to 
studying. It increases the labor supply 
of men and women. However, the 
benefits accrue mostly to wealthier 
rural households 
Ghosh 
(2002) 
Examine the causality 
between  on electricity 
consumption and 
economic growth (GDP 
per capita) in India 
Bi-directional 
Granger Causality 
Approach 
Annual data 1950–51 
to 1996–97 
National Accounts 
Statistics of India, 
Public Electricity 
Supply, All India 
Statistics published 
by Central Electricity 
Authority 
Absence of bi-directional long-run 
equilibrium relationship, but there 
exists unidirectional Granger causality 
running from economic growth to 
electricity consumption without any 
feedback effect. 
Kemmler 
(2007)  
Examine the approaches 
and emphasis 
of rural household 
electrification. 
Binary Choice 
model: Probit 
55th round of the 
National Sample 
Survey India (1999-
2000) 
Marginal impact of electrification of 
log per capita expenditure has a 
coefficient of 0.29. The use of 
electricity depends on household 
characteristics and the attributes of the 
electricity supply. 
Nouni et 
al. (2008) 
Examining the financial 
viability of provisioning 
electricity through 
renewable energy-based 
decentralized generation 
options 
Cost Benefit 
Analysis 
Village census data 
for 1991 census has 
been utilized to 
determine state wise 
number of villages 
Electricity (generated in a coal thermal 
power plant) in remote areas, located in 
the distance range of 5–25km varies 
widely from Rs.13 to 231/kWh.9 
depending on peak load and load 
factor. 
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Renewable energy-based decentralized 
electricity supply options (e.g., micro 
hydro, dual fuel biomass gasifier 
systems, small wind electric generators 
and photovoltaics) could be financially 
attractive as compared to grid 
extension for providing access in small 
remote villages. 
Aklin et 
al.  (2016) 
Examined the 
relationship between 
various dimensions of 
quality of supply 
(duration, reliability and 
voltage stability) and 
household’s subjective 
satisfaction with their 
electricity 
45-min survey of 
Household 
Satisfaction with 
the quality of 
electricity 
8,568 households in 
714 villages in Six 
Indian States: Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh, 
Jharkhand, Orissa, 
Uttar Pradesh, West 
Bengal 
Household satisfaction responding 
strongly to the average hours of 
electricity on a typical day. 
The magnitude of positive effect of 
increasing the number of electricity 
hours per day by one standard 
deviation on satisfaction is almost as 
large as that of electrifying a non-
electrified household. 
Joseph 
(2010) 
Examined the political 
economy of ongoing 
theft, corruption, and 
subsidized pricing 
structures in India in the 
quest to improve service 
Contemporary 
perspectives on 
electricity reforms 
(Electricity Act, 
2003) and 
evidences 
Data collected across 
al l35 Indian districts 
(1994–2005) 
 
Annual reports from 
the Central Electricity 
Authority (CEA) 
Partial reforms and institutional 
failures have led industrial consumers 
across India to exit the state-run system 
and rely on their own on-site power 
generation. 
The generation sector is open to 
private sector, but the distribution 
sector is largely state run with 
subsidized electricity to households 
and agriculture especially in the rural 
sector. 
Subsidy and theft have also led the 
public run SEBS to operate with 
precarious financial positions, 
rendering them incapable of investing 
in needed infrastructural 
improvements, and thus unable to keep 
up with growing demand. 
Bose & 
Shukla 
(1999) 
Examined the 
econometric relationship 
between electricity 
consumption and 
income, price of 
electricity and diesel 
usage and the reliability 
of supply from utilities in 
five major consumer 
categories in India 
Short- and long-run 
elasticity of 
electricity 
consumption: one 
without lagged 
effect and another 
with lagged effect 
of real electricity 
tariff 
Time series data for 9 
years (from 1985/86 
to 1993/94) pooled 
over 19 Indian states1 
The study finds that electricity 
consumption in commercial and large 
industrial sectors are income elastic 
(>1), while residential, agricultural and 
small and medium industries are 
income inelastic (<1). They also find 
that the short-run price elasticities vary 
from -1.35 in agriculture, -0.65 in 
residential, -0.45 in large industry, -
0.26 in commercial and insignificant in 
small and medium industry. 
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(a)                                                                     (b)  
Figure A1: Access and Hours of Electricity in India at the State Level, 2005 
 
